1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
2	DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
3) TN DE DODK INFEEDUCE
4	IN RE PORK ANTITRUST) File No. 18-cv-1776 LITIGATION) (JRT/HB)
5	This document relates to:)
6) Saint Paul, Minnesota ALL CASES) January 8, 2021
7) 9:30 a.m.
8) HEARING CONDUCTED VIA) ZOOM FOR GOVERNMENT
9	
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE HILDY BOWBEER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE JUDGE
11	(MOTIONS HEARING)
12	<u>APPEARANCES</u>
13	Co-Lead Counsel for the LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN PLLP Direct Purchaser ARIELLE WAGNER, ESQ.
14	Plaintiffs: BRIAN D. CLARK, ESQ. 100 Washington Avenue South
15	Suite 2200 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401-2179
16	
17	Co-Lead Counsel for the CUNEO GILBERT & LaDUCA, LLP Commercial/ ALEC BLAINE FINLEY
18	Institutional Indirect 4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW Purchaser Plaintiffs: Suite 200
19	Washington, DC 20016
20	BARRETT LAW GROUP, P.A. KATHERINE BARRETT RILEY, ESQ.
21	404 Court Square North Lexington, Mississippi 39095
	Textudcou, Mississibhi 39033
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	<u>APPEARANCES</u> Co-Lead Counsel for	HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP
2	Consumer Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs:	. ~
3		Suite 202 Berkeley, California 94710
4		-
5		HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP BREANNA VAN ENGELEN, ESQ.
6		1301 Second Avenue Suite 2000 Southle Washington 08101
7		Seattle, Washington 98101
8		GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC BRITTANY RESCH, ESQ. MICHELLE J. LOOBY, ESQ.
9		120 South Sixth Street Suite 2600
10		Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402
11	For Defendant Agri	HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
12	Stats, Inc.	JUSTIN BERNICK, ESQ. 555 13th Street NW
13		Washington, DC 20004
14	For Defendant Clemens Food Group, LLC:	KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP CHRISTINA HENK BRIESACHER, ESQ. 300 North LaSalle Street
15		Chicago, Illinois 60654
16		GREENE ESPEL PLLP MARK L. JOHNSON, ESQ.
17		222 South Ninth Street Suite 2200
18		Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402
19		
20	For Defendant Hormel Foods:	FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH ISAAC B. HALL, ESQ.
21		90 South Seventh Street Suite 2200
22		Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402
23	For Defendant Seaboard Foods:	STINSON LLP PETER J. SCHWINGLER, ESQ. 50 South Sixth Street
24		Suite 2600
25		Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

1	<u>APPEARANCES</u> For Defendant	GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
2	Smithfield Foods:	·
3		Suite 1100 Dallas, Texas 75201
4		
5		LARKIN HOFFMAN DALY & LINDGREN JOHN A. COTTER, ESQ.
6		8300 Norman Center Drive Suite 1000
7		Minneapolis, Minnesota 55437-1060
8	For Defendant Triumph Foods:	HUSCH BLACKWELL LLP CHRISTOPHER A. SMITH,
9	10045.	190 Carondelet Plaza Suite 600
10		Saint Louis, Missouri 63105
11		HUSCH BLACKWELL LLP VOLLIS GENE SUMMERLIN, JR., ESQ.
12		13330 California Street Suite 200
13		Omaha, Nebraska 68154
14	For Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc.:	AXINN VELTROP & HARKRIDER, LLP JAROD TAYLOR, ESQ.
15	roous, inc	90 State House Square Hartford, Connecticut 06103
16		
17		AXINN VELTROP & HARKRIDER, LLP TIFFANY RIDER ROHRBAUGH, ESQ. 950 F Street NW
18		Washington, DC 20004
19	For Defendant JBS USA:	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP
20		SAMI H. RASHID, ESQ.
21		51 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10010
22		SPENCER FANE
23		JESSICA J. NELSON, ESQ. 100 South Fifth Street Suite 2500
24		Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402
25		

1	<u>APPEARANCES</u> For the Commonwealth of SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL
2	Puerto Rico: KONECKY LLP MATTHEW S. WEILER, ESQ.
3	MATTHEW S. WEILER, ESQ. KYLE G. BATES, ESQ. 2000 Powell Street
4	Suite 1400 Emeryville, California 94608
5	For Winn-Dixie Stores AHERN AND ASSOCIATES PC
6	and Bi-Lo Holdings, PATRICK AHERN, ESQ.
7	LLC: 590 North Sheridan Road Lake Forest, Illinois 60045
8	
9	
10	Court Reporter: CARLA R. BEBAULT, RMR, CRR, FCRR 316 North Robert Street
11	Suite 146 U.S. Courthouse Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101
12	
13	
14	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography;
15	transcript produced by computer.
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

PROCEEDINGS

VIA ZOOM FOR GOVERNMENT

THE COURT: All right. This is the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota. I'm
Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer. It looks like we've got at
least a couple of people still working on connecting to
audio so, Mr. Cotter, I see you're now connected. We got
one other person still connecting to audio so let me just
give that another moment. It looked like there may be some
challenges there. Yes. All right. Now we've got
Mr. Rashid. We got one other person connecting. Okay, I
think we got everybody connected who intended to be
connected.

We are convened by Zoom for a hearing in the matter of In Re: Pork Anti-Trust Litigation. This is matter number 18-cv-1776. Specifically we are here for a hearing in a motion that was filed only in that matter and not in the other two related pork matters. It's docket number 555 in 18-cv-1776 and it is plaintiffs' motion to compel custodians and documents.

As for we have a court reporter on with us today who will be preparing the only official transcript of this proceeding. I'm also recording the proceeding through the Zoom platform as a backup to the court reporter in case she

```
1
       loses her connection, but her work and the Zoom recording
2
       that I'm making are the only recordings that may be made of
 3
       the proceeding.
 4
                 Let me go through and get appearances of counsel.
 5
       I'll do it in the way I've done it before and which is
 6
       essentially to call the roll as I understand and according
 7
       to the information I got in advance of the hearing.
 8
                 So first on behalf of plaintiffs and specifically
 9
       the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs, first I understand that
10
       Arielle Wagner is attending. Ms. Wagner, are you on?
11
                 MS. WAGNER: Yes. Good morning.
12
                 THE COURT: And Ms. Wagner, I understand that you
13
       will be the one speaking for all of the plaintiffs with
14
       regard to the motion to compel calendar -- production of
15
       calendars; is that correct?
16
                 MS. WAGNER: That is correct.
17
                 THE COURT: All right. In addition for the Direct
18
       Purchaser Plaintiffs, Bobby Pouya.
19
                 MR. POUYA: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor.
20
                 THE COURT: Good morning. And Michael Pearson.
21
                 MR. PEARSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
22
                 THE COURT: Brian Clark.
23
                 MR. CLARK: Good morning, Your Honor.
24
                 THE COURT: Anyone else for the Direct Purchaser
25
       Plaintiffs? Okay.
```

```
1
                 Turning now to the Consumer Indirect Purchaser
       Plaintiffs. Rio Pierce.
2
 3
                 MR. PIERCE: Good morning, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: And I understand, Mr. Pierce, that you
 4
 5
      will be the one speaking on behalf of all plaintiffs with
 6
       regard to the motion to compel additional custodians by
 7
       Tyson and JBS USA; is that correct?
 8
                 MR. PIERCE: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor.
 9
                 THE COURT: All right. You're speaking a little
10
       softly. It's fine for now, but I may need you to speak up
11
      when the time comes.
12
                 MR. PIERCE: I understand. Thank you.
13
                 THE COURT: Turning now to the Commercial and
14
       Institutional Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs. Shawn Raiter.
15
      Mr. Raiter, are you on? Not yet.
16
                 Blaine Finley.
                 MR. FINLEY: Good morning, Your Honor.
17
18
                 THE COURT: And Katherine Barrett Riley.
19
                 MS. BARRETT: Good morning, Your Honor.
20
                 THE COURT: Are you expecting Mr. Raiter to join
21
      us?
22
                 MR. FINLEY: Not necessarily, Your Honor.
23
                 THE COURT: Okay. So for right now his appearance
24
                       I'm sorry. I missed -- I think I missed
      won't be noted.
25
       additional people on behalf of the Consumer Indirect
```

```
1
       Purchaser Plaintiffs. Let me back up to them.
                                                       Breanna Van
2
       Engelen.
 3
                 MS. VAN ENGELEN: Good morning, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: Sorry to have overlooked you.
 4
 5
       Michelle Looby.
 6
                 MS. LOOBY: Yes, good morning, Your Honor.
 7
                 THE COURT: Brittany Resch.
 8
                 MS. RESCH: Good morning, Your Honor.
 9
                 THE COURT: Are we expecting anyone else on behalf
10
       of the Consumer Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs?
11
                 MR. PIERCE: No, Your Honor.
12
                 THE COURT: Are we expecting anyone else on behalf
13
       of the Commercial and Institutional Indirect Purchaser
14
       Plaintiffs?
15
                 MR. FINLEY: No, Your Honor.
16
                 THE COURT: Turning now -- and I know this
17
       matter -- this motion was not brought in the matter related
18
       to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, but I understand that
19
       there is counsel on the call for Puerto Rico. Matthew
20
       Weiler.
21
                 MR. WEILER: Good morning, Your Honor.
22
                 THE COURT: And Kyle Bates.
23
                 MR. BATES: Good morning, Your Honor.
24
                 THE COURT: Anyone else who would like their
25
       appearance noted on behalf of the Commonwealth of Puerto
```

1	Rico?
2	(No response.)
3	THE COURT: All right. And then the other related
4	action, again, an action which this motion was brought but
5	wanting to recognize the appearance of counsel in connection
6	with the matter brought by Winn-Dixie Stores and Bi-Lo
7	Holdings. Patrick Ahern.
8	MR. AHERN: Good morning, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Anyone else on behalf of Winn-Dixie
10	and Bi-Lo?
11	MR. AHERN: No, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: All right. Have I missed anyone who
13	would like their appearance noted on behalf of any of the
14	plaintiffs in these matters?
15	(No response.)
16	THE COURT: Turning now to counsel for the
17	defendants. Agri Stats, Justin Bernick.
18	MR. BERNICK: Good morning, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: Anyone else for Agri Stats that you
20	know of, Mr. Bernick?
21	MR. BERNICK: No, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: Clemens Food Group and the related
23	Clemens defendants. Christina Briesacher.
24	MS. BRIESACHER: Good morning, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Mark Johnson.

1	MR. JOHNSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: And anyone else that wants to have
3	their appearance noted for the Clemens defendants?
4	(No response.)
5	THE COURT: Okay. Now, Hormel, I know there's a
6	dismissal pending for Hormel. Do I have anyone on
7	representing Hormel this morning?
8	MR. HALL: You do. It's Isaac Hall, and I think
9	the dismissal is just for one of the Hormel defendants.
10	THE COURT: Got it. Okay. And is there anyone
11	other than Mr. Hall appearing this morning on behalf of
12	Hormel?
13	MR. HALL: Not to my knowledge.
14	THE COURT: Next turning to Seaboard Foods. Peter
15	Schwingler.
16	MR. SCHWINGLER: Good morning, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Anyone else on behalf of Seaboard
18	Foods?
19	MR. SCHWINGLER: Not this morning. Just me.
20	Thank you.
21	THE COURT: Smithfield Foods. Brian Robison.
22	MR. ROBISON: Good morning, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: John Cotter.
24	MR. COTTER: Good morning, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Anyone else on behalf of Smithfield

1	Foods?
2	MR. ROBISON: No, Your Honor, that's just the two
3	of us.
4	THE COURT: Turning to Triumph Foods. Christopher
5	Smith.
6	MR. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Anyone else on behalf of Triumph?
8	MR. SMITH: I believe Gene Summerlin is also on by
9	audio.
10	THE COURT: Mr. Summerlin, are you on? I see a
11	little box with his name on it. Mr. Summerlin, are you on?
12	MR. SUMMERLIN: I am, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: All right. Anyone else for Triumph?
14	MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Tyson Foods. Tiffany Rohrbaugh.
16	MS. ROHRBAUGH: Good morning, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Jarod Taylor.
18	MR. TAYLOR: Good morning, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: And is anyone else on for Tyson?
20	(No response.)
21	THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Taylor, I understand
22	you will be speaking at least to the custodians issue
23	relating to Tyson. Are you going to be addressing any of
24	the other issues raised by the plaintiffs' motion?
25	MR. TAYLOR: The reverse of that actually, Your

```
1
               I will be addressing the calendar issue on behalf of
2
       all defendants.
 3
                 THE COURT: All right. And who will be speaking
       for Tyson with regard to the custodians issue?
 4
 5
                 MS. ROHRBAUGH: Your Honor, this is Tiffany
 6
      Rohrbaugh. I will be addressing the Tyson custodial issue.
 7
                 THE COURT: All right. Got it.
                                                  Thank you.
 8
                 Anyone else for Tyson? I may have asked that
 9
      question. Okay. Nobody else.
10
                 And then on behalf of JBS USA. Sami Rashid.
11
                 MR. RASHID: Good morning, Your Honor.
12
                 THE COURT: And Mr. Rashid, I understand that you
13
      will be addressing the motion insofar as it pertains to
14
       additional JBS custodians; is that correct?
15
                 MR. RASHID: Yes, Your Honor.
16
                 THE COURT: And it looks like Jessica Nelson is
17
       also appearing for JBS. Ms. Nelson.
18
                 MS. NELSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
19
                 THE COURT: Anyone else for JBS?
20
                 MR. RASHID: No, Your Honor, just the two of us.
21
                 THE COURT: Have I missed anyone who wants their
22
       appearance noted on behalf of any of the defendants?
23
                 All right. Well, I think we now have a complete
24
       roll call. I'm going to not go through my usual speech
25
       about how I want you to behave today because you've heard
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that speech already. I will just remind everybody who is not speaking at the time or about to speak to please mute your audio; and I'll also ask anyone who isn't going to be addressing some part of this motion also block video. you're going to be speaking to some part of this motion, whether it's calendars or custodians, please go ahead and leave your video up, but otherwise I'll ask that you block And I'm going to take one moment here and block all of those extra boxes. All right. So I am now seeing our court reporter, of course. I am seeing Ms. Rohrbaugh, I'm seeing Mr. Rashid, Mr. Taylor, Ms. Wagner and Mr. Pierce. So I think I've got everybody I need. This is plaintiffs' motion. I'm inclined to start with the calendar issue unless you've got a strong view to the contrary. And so, Ms. Wagner, I believe that one is yours; is that correct? MS. WAGNER: Yes, I will be speaking to the calendar issue and I don't think we have a strong preference on which one is presented first. THE COURT: All right. Well, let's start there then. MS. WAGNER: So we are asking defendants to produce all electronic and hard copy diaries, calendars, appointment books, to-do lists for each custodian. We think the calendars and related documents are critical in

anti-trust cases. This is not the type of case that defendants cite to in their brief. It's not an employment law case or a fraud case or an assault case. It's anti-trust conspiracy, and these types of documents that we're talking about today often expose contacts and coordination between competitors.

Calendars show things like internal meetings, business meetings, you know, social outings with competitors, and that's directly related to what we allege in our complaint.

THE COURT: Well, I don't -- I don't think the defendants are disagreeing with the premise that really relevant stuff can be found in calendar entries. Where the disconnect is is whether that mandates that they produce custodians' entire calendars with all entries, saving out some deeply personal or deeply and irrelevant, competitively, sensitive information. And so I think that's what I'd like you to focus on, and particularly if -- and I recognize your point that the cases they have cited aren't anti-trust cases, but they do still generally stand for the proposition that courts are loathe to require the production of entire diaries, journals, calendars. Have you got cases in which -- anti-trust cases in which courts have required that?

MS. WAGNER: Your Honor, I mean, in my experience

we cited to the *In Re: Generic Drug Litigation* case, and in that case, you know, anything that hit on a search term and most go-get documents, you know, including hard copy documents, electronic calendars, you know, were produced wholesale unless there was attorney-client privilege or PHI involved. So there were even less, you know, redactions or withholdings allowed, and that was appealed all the way up to the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: But you're saying that that's one in which the parties agreed to search terms and agreed -- or the Court ordered that everything that hit on a search term would be produced with these very narrow exceptions.

MS. WAGNER: The parties agreed to search terms but the Court ordered that anything that was a search term hit or a go-get document, and there were many categories of go-get documents, were to be turned over without review.

And, you know, I think there were one or two companies where the parties negotiated a limited relevance review that had a sampling process in camera by a Special Master. I don't think anyone enjoyed that process. I don't think we want to suggest that.

THE COURT: This is not volunteering to do that.

MS. WAGNER: The default was the hard copy and electronic calendars were turned over. And in my experience in the cases that I've worked on, which is almost all

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

anti-trust related, calendars were treated as go-get documents and handed over, whether in hard copy or .pst files. THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. MS. WAGNER: Yes, our main concern is with having large portions of the calendars, you know, redacted or culled or withheld. So what it comes down to is that the calendars and journals and appointment books are just a different sort of document because they are hard to decipher without the whole context of discovery. You know, I think we have examples in our briefing of things like, you know, WB meeting that we are concerned about, you know, things that aren't relevant on the face of the documents but are clearly relevant in context. And so if there is a manual review, our concern is that, you know, anyone looking at just one custodian's calendar items will miss things that don't appear to be

that, you know, anyone looking at just one custodian's calendar items will miss things that don't appear to be relevant on their face. It's hard for plaintiffs to look at just one calendar and tell what's relevant. It's only after looking at the documents together with everyone else's documents that we see patterns emerge.

THE COURT: So at least in this case at this point the parties have not agreed to treat calendars as go-get document, right?

MS. WAGNER: I believe that's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. And I know you argue that the ESI Protocol and specifically the redactions clause, if you will, of the ESI Protocol would preclude what the defendants are proposing to do, but isn't the better understanding, at least thinking about electronic calendars, isn't the better understanding of electronic calendars that they are not a single, integrated document; that calendar entries are individual documents. So I guess my sense is that that redactions clause, at least insofar as we're talking about electronic calendars, just doesn't apply here. Do you --

MS. WAGNER: I think the issues were a little bit conflated in our briefing. I don't think we're necessarily saying that electronic calendars are one document. I think we were referring more to the hard copy calendars. You know, whether we call it a redaction of one document or culling or withholding documents, we just don't agree you can withhold for relevance. So I think we're looking at, you know, kind of two separate but related issues. Because I agree hard copy calendars and journals are a little bit different from electronic calendars.

You know, with hard copy documents, it's more straightforward because this, you know, one bound document, like you said, or maybe one per year, and we think the ESI Protocol is even more clear there. But we're -- we're still concerned with the hard copy documents because I believe

defendants said in their briefing they referenced leaving out pages of calendars or hard copies, documents, and we don't think that should be allowed under the ESI Protocol.

And electronic calendars are a little different because they can be searched like an e-mail, but unlike e-mail they serve a different function. You know, some can be sent to others, you know, with the domain address like an e-mail, and that would be captured by a search term. But some calendar entries are for individual's own reference and it might just say, Call Bill at 3:00. So it's not clear that we would be getting that document from, you know, search terms or from a manual review.

THE COURT: But essentially what you're saying is because it may be especially difficult to cull or search or review calendars, therefore there should be no requirement that -- I'll speak to electronic calendars for the moment because the hard copy calendars is a -- that's a tougher question given the ESI Protocol and, I don't know, I'll have a conversation with defendants about that.

But thinking about the electronic calendars, is -where is the case law that supports the idea that because it
might be especially difficult to review, therefore it ought
to be turned over in its totality without regard to
relevance or responsiveness?

MS. WAGNER: I mean, again, I would point to the

In Re: Generic Drug case. I think there are things in electronic calendars that we, you know, might agree to if defendants want to take the time to go through each entry one by one; but we don't think that electronic documents are amenable to search terms. I mean, we are -- we have submitted our counterproposals to the search terms for defendants that we are discussing right now, and there -- even if we go with our broadest search terms, there's still a lot of calendar entries that wouldn't be hit by those terms. And we've been hesitant to go down that road because it leads to the problem that we're talking about with the, you know, Lunch with WB entries that can be relevant but aren't clear on the face of the document.

So I think we could agree to some sort of manual review of those calendars as long as there are clear parameters. And to be clear, we haven't talked about those parameters with my colleagues; but, you know, perhaps something like, you know, unless it's clearly not relevant, we want it. You know, we are very much interested in things like internal meetings and business meetings and, you know, the drinks with competitors, and those aren't things that defendants have indicated will be produced.

THE COURT: Anything else on this particular issue?

MS. WAGNER: I believe that that hits all of my

1 main points for now. 2 THE COURT: Okay. No doubt I'll come back to you 3 after I hear from defendants' counsel. Now I understand, 4 Mr. Taylor, you're the one addressing calendars for the 5 defendants; is that right? 6 MR. TAYLOR: Correct. Good morning, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Good morning. Go ahead. 8 MR. TAYLOR: Sure. So just to start out with a 9 case that came up a couple of times during opposing 10 counsel's argument, I got what I believe the case to be open 11 in front of me, In Re: Generic Pharmaceutical case. I don't 12 think it applies here. I don't think it addressed calendar 13 entries. The issue before the Court was whether the parties 14 may redact or withhold. 15 THE COURT: Could you give me a cite so I can make sure we're talking about the same case? 16 17 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, I have -- it's a copy so there's 18 no Federal Reporter cite, but the Westlaw cite is 2019 WL 19 1613437. 20 THE COURT: Go ahead. 21 MR. TAYLOR: And so my understanding is that case 22 involved redactions of what were otherwise indisputably 23 responsive documents and not how we're going to find 24 responsive documents or whether indisputably nonresponsive 25 documents should be handed over just so that nothing is

misinterpreted or missed. So I don't think it applies directly to our issue here.

With respect to the latter part of the argument we just heard, I will say I wished plaintiffs had raised that with us before this morning. My impression is that is a conversation we tried to have during the meet and confer and made no progress. We asked --

THE COURT: I'm going to -- there's some kind of scraping noise. I don't know, Mr. Taylor, if something you're wearing is scraping against your microphone but, yeah, why don't you try that. Go ahead and speak again and let's see if sitting up resolves it.

MR. TAYLOR: I'm sure that was it, Your Honor.

I'll try to keep my mic away from my tie. Better?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. TAYLOR: Great. Thank you.

So, you know, we are similarly open to a discussion about what exactly plaintiffs are looking for but, you know, the issue in the motion is whether we are going to produce everything wholesale. And I'm glad to hear that perhaps that is no longer plaintiffs' position because I do think that is, as set forth in our brief, there's no case law support for it and there's no rationale for treating this case differently from every other case that involved review of electronic documents.

THE COURT: What about the argument -- and I know it was you that pointed it out in your brief that at this point you don't necessarily know how many custodians had those, you know, vettable Day Timers and, you know, the calendars that we used to keep, but on the assumption that there are some of those out there during the class period, how do you square your position on those with the redactions provision in the ESI Protocol?

MR. TAYLOR: Well, the ESI Protocol, as they all are, is necessarily, you know, it's a rule that is a broad rule intended to address both of the issues the parties can foresee at the time. I would say that arguably this specific issue wasn't really foreseen when that specific provision was negotiated and that calendar entries are different from the usual documents, and therefore the rationale against redactions really doesn't apply to calendar entries in the same way that it might to an e-mail.

You know, if you're taking a single document that's a whole year or even a whole month, each of those entries is a discrete entry. It's put in at a different time about a different subject matter for a different purpose. So, you know, as we described somewhat in our brief, an entry made at one time in January just won't likely provide context for a different entry about a different subject made in September.

And that's completely different from the typical document, a Word document or an e-mail to which the ESI Protocol was more intended to apply to where it's all made around the same time and therefore one part of it could provide context to a different part of it. I just think calendar entries are radically different in that respect.

You know, as we discussed, the electronic calendars are more clearly different documents where each entry is a different document. And I don't think it is rational to treat them differently depending on whether they are hard copy or electronic just because of the change in technology. The principle is just the same. Each entry is really discrete in a calendar and we have cited a number of cases that at least indirectly, you know, hint at that. That really diaries, calendars and similar documents should -- each entry it is fair to treat as a separate quasi-document, so to speak.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MR. TAYLOR: You know, I had a fair bit to say about why defendant should not be required to produce every entry; but again, on the understanding that that perhaps is no longer plaintiffs' position, and we will go back to meet and confer to the extent necessary, I think those are really the highpoints as long as I've answered all of Your Honor's questions.

THE COURT: I guess I don't know for sure if that's not still plaintiffs' position or if they were suggesting, if I was bound and determined to go against them, suggesting another possibility. But let me check back with Ms. Wagner and if it turns out that you overestimated her position, I'll give you a chance to make any additional points you care to. So I'll let you go on mute.

Ms. Wagner.

MS. WAGNER: Yeah, I -- I'm hesitant to say that we are for sure going to agree to some sort of, you know, clear parameters on what type of relevance review would be allowed or not. I think our position is still that we want all of the calendar entries except for those that we have carved out in the ESI Protocol.

And I think we have discussed certain limiters before with defendants and we just could not agree. I think, for instance, some of the defendants referenced, you know, producing only calendar entries that talked about pork or production or output capacity; and, you know, that's just not going to get plaintiffs what we are seeking.

And then I just want to clarify that I think I agree with Mr. Taylor that the *Generic Drugs* order that I cite doesn't specifically mention calendar entries in it. I was just expressing my experience in the case.

THE COURT: All right. I appreciate that. Thank

you.

All right. So, Mr. Taylor, with that clarification, anything -- any additional points you wanted to be sure to make?

MR. TAYLOR: A few highpoints, yes. If you will entertain them, I appreciate it.

You know, I think it is worth emphasizing the breadth of plaintiffs' original ask then. There's really no attempts to distinguish among custodians those who have decision-making authority from those who don't, who are involved in pork production from accountants or any other custodian. There's no attempt to limit the request to relevant dates such as dates of the relevant trade association events; and of course, as we have been discussing, no attempts to limit the request to the relevant subject matter. You know, so this is really a complete, I think as Your Honor noted, attempt to jettison the concept of relevance with respect to these documents.

And to be clear to another point that came up during the first portion of plaintiffs' argument, defendants will be diligent in doing their responsiveness review. As I was preparing for this argument one of my colleagues gave an anecdote from when she was an associate and she said she had to review calendars and this one custodian only used initials, but they went back and they found out what those

initials meant. They did their diligence, and by the end of the review she could read the calendar as well as the custodian.

And we are not suggesting that we will be lackadaisical about this, nor will we unilaterally determine what is relevant and what is not. All defendant seeks is to determine what is responsive and what is not, which is the ordinary course in review. And plaintiffs' brief in fact acknowledges, as I think it must, that not every calendar entry is actually relevant to what they are seeking. In fact, I'm not sure that most internal meetings are really relevant to what they are getting at. Their brief mentions competitor communications. And certainly in that case most of what plaintiffs are asking for will not be relevant.

In Tyson's case in particular I know that we have custodians whose primary responsibility is or has been in the relevant period other products other than pork. So it is really an extraordinary look under the hood that plaintiffs seek and we don't believe that they have justified turning discovery rules on its head so that plaintiffs can do the respondent's review instead of defendants.

And again, plaintiffs will have ample opportunity to seek out the types of evidence they are seeking. One of their examples from their brief that they were worried could

be misinterpreted is a call with Bill. But plaintiffs have already received call records in this case and they have subpoenaed call records from carriers. At the end of the day they are going to know who all of the calls were to and from. And they are similarly to receive millions of pages of e-mails, dozens of depositions, which is the rationale underlying a decision denying the production of complete calendar entries in the *Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology* case that defendants cite in their brief.

And my last point is just that I don't think the prejudice of what plaintiffs are seeking can be hand-waved away by pointing to the protective order. Discovery just doesn't work by entering a protective order and then turning over all documents to the opposing side for them to review.

You know, many employees don't keep a, quote, unquote, work calendar. They keep a calendar. And that's where they put their work appointments. Yes, that's probably most of what will be on the calendar, but that's also where they put their personal appointments. I know that's how I do it. The case law recognizes that as a cost. It's just not fair to the employees to put all of their information out there like that. It's not enough you have to turn it over to us. I'm sure they're not happy to see us coming, but sending it over to multiple -- probably literally dozens of counsel, other counsel, is not what they

1 bargained for. 2 And similarly, plaintiffs just have no entitlement 3 to documents about tortillas or beef or chicken, internal 4 charitable efforts, prayer groups, all of the other things 5 that could go on a calendar entry. 6 So for those reasons we think that a 7 responsiveness review as in the ordinary course is warranted here. 8 9 THE COURT: So your proposal specifically, 10 Mr. Taylor, is what? In other words, if this were to pursue 11 a process that defendants believe would make good sense in, 12 you know, in contrast to turning over all calendar entries 13 except highly personal information or highly sensitive, 14 highly-highly sensitive information that isn't relevant, 15 what would the process be? What are you looking to have 16 happen? 17 MR. TAYLOR: Well, just one clarification. You 18 know, defendants don't seek merely to not produce 19 necessarily highly-sensitive information, but --20 THE COURT: I think that's what -- my 21 understanding is what the plaintiffs claim is you need --22 default is all calendar entries come over except the narrow 23 categories that are described in the ESI Protocol for 24 redactions, and you want a different process. What --

precisely what process are you proposing?

25

1 For the calendar entries to be MR. TAYLOR: 2 treated like the other documents in this case and to go 3 through the normal review process, which could involve --4 THE COURT: Yeah, I'm sorry. My question wasn't 5 very clear. I do understand that. But you've also talked 6 about you'd like to meet and confer with plaintiffs. 7 other words, there are a couple ways, if I were to deny the 8 motion, there are a couple of ways it could go. Either you 9 all kind of do what you're gonna do with calendar entries 10 but be very clear in your written responses about exactly 11 what you did. In other words, how you interpreted 12 responsiveness and precisely what parameters you applied, or 13 you -- and you suggested this as well here today and in your 14 brief -- you meet and confer with plaintiffs and try to come 15 to some consensus about -- and there are a couple of topics 16 on the table. 17 One is what will be responsive, what are the 18 parameters you look for. And then there's also been some 19 discussion certainly on their part, and I think you were --20 it sounded like you were amenable to it, about the means of review. Search terms versus manual, and you suggested you 21 22 might be open to a conversation about that as well. So kind 23 of harkening back to my product liability days, what's your 24 proposed reasonable alternative design?

MR. TAYLOR: We're always willing -- you know,

25

it's a little difficult to say. We're always willing to meet and confer with the other side. If they have a request to make that is more reasonable than hand everything over, we are willing to hear them out.

I don't actually think that treating these calendar entries, other than the other documents we're negotiating about, differently from those documents is warranted. I really haven't heard a rationale justifying that. So we would propose producing what is responsive to the merely 40 other document requests that plaintiffs have issued. Calendars entries are certainly a type of document and we would review those and produce them to the extent they are responsive to the other requests.

To the extent plaintiffs are seeking something else, we are willing to hear them out. Defendants don't think it's appropriate for plaintiffs to have a say in how each of the defendants reviewed those documents; but, again, you know, we're willing to hear proposals out and kind of work through that.

But it's difficult to make kind of a binding commitment of exactly what we will do right now without having that conversation. So I'm just hesitant to do that, Your Honor. I don't mean to be evasive.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Wagner, let me give you one more chance at a reply here.

MS. WAGNER: Okay. So after hearing more about, you know, what Mr. Taylor has to say, I think if we had some guideposts on the electronic calendars, we would be willing to discuss, you know, the exact parameters of where this cutoff would be on a manual review.

And just to be clear, plaintiffs still really don't think that redactions of hard copy journals and calendars are appropriate at all. We're particularly concerned there, and it's really hard to do anything with someone's hard copy calendar where pages have been ripped out. But, you know, I think we are willing to discuss, you know, if we have some guideposts on the electronic calendar.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. So kind of to cut to the bottom line and then try to work my way back, I am going to deny the plaintiffs' motion as framed, both as to electronic calendars as well as the hard copy calendars, although that is a closer call and I'll talk about that just a bit.

But in that regard, I think Mr. Taylor's point, which sort of translates to elevating form over substance, if you will, I think that because entries on hard copy calendars are also individual entries, and in this regard I do think that the case law out there, albeit not in the anti-trust context in which courts have not treated a journal or a Day Timer or a diary as a single document, but

have said that individual entries should be produced as to the extent relevant and responsive, although within any individual entry you would not redact except as the ESI Protocol permits.

So I'll apply this ruling both to hard copy and to electronic documents and I'm persuaded that a wholesale requirement that all calendar entries during the relevant time period for all custodians, whether in hard copy or electronically, goes against Rule 26 and the requirement of relevance.

The question then is kind of what next. I hear the defendants saying that they would at a minimum read the other requests, sort of the scope description of other requests that have been made, onto the request for calendars and produce responsive entries for calendars the same as responsive entries for other types of documents and communications.

That being said, I do agree with plaintiffs that there are some respects in which calendar entries that aren't on their face responsive or relevant -- well, responsive, could still be relevant. For example, I think one of the points you made in your brief, Ms. Wagner, was where were they? And so you could have an appointment to talk to so and so on Thursday, and potentially a note about travel plans two days earlier would tell you something about

where that conversation was going to happen.

So what I'm going to require is that the parties do meet and confer to try to come to a description of relevant and, more particularly, responsive calendar entries and see if you can get to agreement about what responsibility the defendants are going to undertake to produce calendar entries that fit those parameters.

With regard to the means of review, ultimately I agree that's up to defendants, but I do think a good conversation on that subject would also be helpful. For example, certainly hard copy calendars I think would be immensely difficult to review other than manually. And I think a robust conversation about whether search terms will be a part of a review strategy for electronic calendars or whether there are additional means that would be taken, I'm not saying that plaintiffs get to dictate that, but I do think that a conversation about that and hopefully an agreement on that subject could assist in avoiding the need for repeating the work later.

But to that point, certainly, as Mr. Taylor pointed out, you will have call records, you will have e-mails, and if e-mails and call records and all of that other discovery tells you down the line that there are calendar entries that may have gotten missed, and those are the kinds of gaps that get brought to the attention of the

```
1
       other side and give rise either to a supplement or to a
2
       motion requiring a supplementation.
 3
                 So I'm denying the motion as framed, but I am
 4
       going to instruct you to have that meet and confer.
 5
       Whatever comes out of that, I want to be very clear with
 6
       defendants that I expect your written responses to reflect
 7
       clearly what scope you applied. If it's an agreed scope,
 8
       then cite the agreement. If you couldn't reach an agreement
 9
       and you came up with your own plan, describe the scope of
10
       what you looked for. I don't want you to say, Well, we
11
       explained it in our brief; or, They should understood that
12
       we were applying these other parameters from these other
13
       requests. Be clear in your response. We looked for and we
14
       produced calendar entries within the following parameters.
15
                 Mr. Taylor, do you understand what I'm getting at
16
       there?
17
                 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor.
18
                 THE COURT: Okay. Any questions before we move on
19
       to custodians, Ms. Wagner?
20
                 MS. WAGNER: No, Your Honor.
21
                 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Taylor?
22
                 MR. TAYLOR: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
23
                 THE COURT: All right. So let's move on to the
24
       issue of custodians. And Mr. Pierce, I believe you were
25
       going to be talking about custodians with respect to both of
```

the defendants. Is that correct?

MR. PIERCE: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from you

there.

MR. PIERCE: Okay. To start with, for JBS we have asked for four custodians. That would be Wesley Batista and Don Jackson and Andrew Nogueira, who each served as CEO of JBS USA during the relevant period. We also asked for Wesley Batista [sic] who was CEO of JBS South America, which is the parent corporation of JBS USA and also, our understanding, a controlling shareholder of JBS USA because of the family's ownership of the company.

Our position is that these custodians are relevant because we have good reasons for believing that each of them had ultimate responsibility for JBS USA's pork operations.

JBS itself in its own brief stated that JBS USA does not dispute some of the custodians had ultimate responsibility.

We understand JBS's point that those custodians, because they were CEO of JBS USA, also oversaw other business units at JBS USA; but we would also note that both Tyson and Hormel are also large conglomerates who have multiple business operations in various protein segments, and each of those companies have designated those -- the CEOs of those companies as custodians and we think the same is appropriate here for JBS.

We think that the entire point of a search term process is that it helps to narrow the ESI collected so that, you know, through a combination of the search terms that you hit upon, you're able to relatively easily -- I don't mean to minimize the burden -- but if there is a process that works, remove the relevant documents relating to JBS's beef business and that should significantly lessen any burden that JBS would face for designating these individuals as custodians.

We have specific reasons for thinking that each of these individuals have relevant information. For example, Mr. Batista gave several comments about JBS's pork operations that we quoted in our complaint. In particular, in May 2013, Mr. Batista stated that given some restrictions in supply, we have been able to pass price through the system and we are seeing good margins in our pork business. So this is a clear sign that we have been able to pass price increases in chicken and pork. We think that's a common —that's very important for the central allegation in this case, which is the supply restriction as well as pass—through issues, which are important for class certification and anti-trust impact. So based on that kind of statement, we think Mr. Batista should be a custodian.

We've also -- I think the case law is clear that plaintiffs, when they make a request, should have reasons

for believing that ESI wouldn't be collected from other sources. We think there's good reasons to believe based on JBS's own public statements that, for example, Mr. Batista and Mr. Batista, the two brothers, were frequently and directly communicating with each other; and if those communications are just between them, then there's nobody else who is going to have that ESI to the extent that it exists in an e-mail.

Similarly, Mr. Jackson and Mr. Nogueira served as CEO and CFO of JBS USA during a key portion of the conspiracy period, and so we think that if they had a direct e-mail communication and nobody else was on it, then it's not going to be collected from other ESI.

So I think those were the key points I wanted to hit initially. Happy to take questions or move on to Tyson.

THE COURT: Aren't there -- yes, in the sense that one could always surmise that two people talk only with each other and therefore if you don't collect from either of them, you don't get those communications, but doesn't there have to be some reason to anticipate that there are communications that are truly pertinent to the issues here and that wouldn't be reflected in the e-mails of the other custodians? I mean, yes, the CEO always has ultimate responsibility, but that doesn't -- if that were the only test, then every CEO would always have to be a custodian.

So I'm struggling with whether there's enough here to show more than speculation that any of these individuals have unique information within their e-mail accounts that wouldn't either be in the e-mail accounts of the custodians that are being searched or wouldn't be discernible once the results of that production -- of that search were produced.

MR. PIERCE: Sure. We -- I understand that concern, Your Honor. I think we have a reasonable basis for thinking that they have unique ESI based on their positions in the company. We also would note that we're talking about several different individuals who we think are likely communicating with each other about a very significant part of JBS's business operations. Our understanding is JBS USA primarily has two business units, the pork business unit and the beef business unit.

So we think this is distinct, for example, from a case where you have a CEO of a large company and you're dealing with an employment dispute or a dispute for a very small segment of the company's business operations. We're talking about an important segment of the company's business operations.

And we would also note that JBS provided a declaration from Mr. Gaddis that simply stated how much ESI just one of the custodians, Mr. Nogueira, had. But they have not done anything to show that, for instance, we have

```
1
       done an initial look and there are no documents that are
2
       uniquely hitting on these custodians' ESI versus the
 3
       custodians that we have already offered. So based on that,
       we think that we have a reasonable basis for thinking that.
 4
 5
                 We'd also note that based on the public statements
 6
       that Mr. Batista and Mr. Jackson and Mr. Noqueira also offer
 7
       public statements on JBS's pork operations, that these are
 8
       reasonable candidates for deposition. And so we think in
 9
       order to take an effective deposition of them, it would be
10
       reasonable to want their ESI up front. So I also wanted to
11
       flag that issue.
12
                 THE COURT: Of course, I would imagine that if at
13
       that point we'll probably be looking at motion practice
14
       about apex depositions, right?
15
                 MR. PIERCE: Sure, sure.
16
                 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Anything else
17
       before I hear from Mr. Rashid?
18
                 MR. PIERCE: No, Your Honor.
19
                 THE COURT: So Mr. Rashid, what about the point
20
       that alone among the defendants here JBS is the only one
21
       that has not included among its custodians the CEO or CEOs
22
       during the relevant time period?
23
                 MR. RASHID: Yeah. I think, Your Honor -- first
24
       of all, good morning and happy new year. That's a fair
25
       point to raise and I think it -- I mean, I think you need to
```

start with the standard, the legal standards surrounding these types of disputes. And I think if you look at page 11 of plaintiffs' briefs, they cite to the Sedona Principles and they say: For the purposes of resolving disputes over designated ESI custodians, determining what is relevant and proportional under the circumstances of each matter often requires a highly fact-specific inquiry. And we agree with that, which is why we don't agree with the assertion that being a CEO automatically makes you a document custodian.

But more to that, plaintiffs omit from their brief that very next line in the Sedona Principles which states:

Thus the responding party, not the court or the requested party, is both tasked with making those determinations and generally in a better position to make those decisions.

And it's just simply not the case that because other defendants determined for sake of compromise or for sake of the way those companies were managed they were willing to propose or accept their CEOs as custodians, it doesn't mean that that's necessarily true here. And I think that what we've tried to show, Your Honor, through our brief and through the declaration of Mr. Gaddis, who has been with the company in senior human resources and legal roles since 2007 and beyond covering the entire relevant time period, is that people who are really making the relevant decisions that lie at the heart of plaintiffs' case, which are

decisions about, as they say on page 11 of their brief, business decisions regarding pork supply, output and pricing, that is the Pork Management Team. That is literally what that group, that leadership group is called, and they meet day in and day out, and they manage and make the decisions about the company's procurement and raising of hogs for pork processing. They make decisions about how much their pork is going to be produced, and they make decisions about the price at which the pork is sold.

And so the CEO, the disputed custodians, aren't involved in those decisions that lie at the heart of this dispute. And that is why we said, you know, No, we don't think they are necessary. You know, we're not going to limit our proposal at the end of the day to just the Pork Management Team, although frankly I think that's defensible. We ended up giving them a bunch more custodians so we're up to 28 custodians.

But we said with respect to the CEOs and Mr. Joesley Batista, who had no management role whatsoever at JBS USA, we said, you know, they weren't involved in these decisions.

So I don't think it's necessarily a situation where what's good for the goose is good for the gander.

What's good for the other defendants is necessarily good for JBS.

I think what we've tried to do is in conformity with the case law make a determination that, in the words of the *EpiPen* court, you know, these are not the -- you have to assess both the level of involvement in discussions and decisions serving as the basis for the claims at issue in this case, end quote. And I think as the *EpiPen* court went on to say that mere speculation is not a basis for designating senior executives of custodians.

And so what we have tried to explain to plaintiffs first, and now to Your Honor in our briefing, is that we do not believe the disputed custodians satisfy that criteria.

And, you know, Mr. Pierce pointed to some things that he maintained satisfied that type of criteria. But I think, you know, I may be over reading some of Your Honor's questions, but I think a lot of that, a lot of the information that Mr. Pierce provided could be characterized, as it is in a lot of the cases that we cited, as the type of sort of generalized assertions that just because someone is a senior executive they must have relevant and unique information.

But that is not the approach that the courts take in resolving these issues. They really hold plaintiffs to a higher standard in terms of showing, getting through the gate and demonstrating factually that the disputed senior executives have unique information about the decision making

that's at issue in the case before they allow them to be document custodians.

And we see that in the *EpiPen* case. I mean, the *EpiPen* case, the court ordered the inclusion of the CEO because plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated that he was, quote, involved in discussions and decisions regarding the relevant price increases. That's not the case here.

But in contrast, in the *Krueger* case the Court came out the opposite way, which we cite to, because it determined that the disputed custodian wasn't involved in the decision making at issue.

So, you know, I think what we've tried to do and what we have done is appropriate given the realities of decision making at the company and in line with the case law on these types of issues.

THE COURT: What about Mr. Pierce's query about, well, have you done any testing, have you done any sampling, to see -- to test your assumption that there wouldn't be anything unique in those accounts?

MR. RASHID: Well, right, Your Honor, I think you correctly surmised you're always going to expect that two different people are going to have some unique documents, right? And so there is a proportionality analysis that would have to be built into that. But we haven't done any specific testing, but what we have done is we've talked to

1 the company, we've talked to -- we understand how the Pork 2 Management Team works, and we understand the function and 3 the role of the disputed CEO custodians in that framework. 4 And it's undoubtedly clear, and we do not dispute, 5 that the CEOs have ultimate responsibility over the pork 6 business. But as we point out, they have ultimate 7 responsibility over beef and lamb and even operations in 8 Australia. 9 And so I think we feel very comfortable on the 10 basis of our inquiry to say that to the extent the -- these 11 individuals were apprised of relevant pricing, procurement 12 or production decisions, those interactions are going to be 13 reflected in any interactions they had with the Pork 14 Management Team during the time, including the president of 15 the pork -- the President and the Chief Operating Officer of 16 the Pork Management Team during this entire period, 17 Mr. Marty Dooley. He held that role from 2007 to late 2019, 18 so he was there for the entire period, and he's going to be 19 a document custodian. 20 And so to the extent that they are getting updates 21 on the business, it's going to be with him. To the extent

And so to the extent that they are getting updates on the business, it's going to be with him. To the extent they are asking questions about the business, it's going to be through him.

So I can't say definitively, Your Honor, that there's not going to be a single or any unique

22

23

24

25

communications out there as you yourself noted. But I do
think that in sort of the context of the inquiry that we've
done with the company and the inquiry -- and the analysis
that the courts do in disputes like this as reflected by the
case law that we have cited, we have made a sufficient
showing to -- that plaintiffs -- that plaintiffs' request
here is at the very least premature and if not, you know, if
it shouldn't be entirely rejected.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pierce, anything further on the JBS issue before I have you turn to Tyson?

MR. PIERCE: Sure. Just a few quick points.

Mr. Rashid acknowledged that there may be some unique ESI for these custodians. In fact he said that he would expect that. What I would say is that in anti-trust cases these cases often turn on a relatively small number of documents.

Another key issue in anti-trust law is the seniority of the executives responsible for making decisions. For example, the common thing is shop talk among sales reps is often not enough to survive summary judgment; whereas, in comparison, I would think the shop talk among CEOs would be enough to survive summary judgment. And so the fact that these CEOs who have ultimate responsibility of the business have some unique ESI and are ultimately responsible for the key business decisions on which

liability is going to rest in this case, to us justifies under the relevance standards that it is proportional to designate these individuals as custodians, especially since Mr. Rashid has not provided any specific documentation of how much unique ESI they have, or any additional information besides a simple note that one of the custodians has a large number of documents in his file.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rashid, yes, you wanted to respond.

MR. RASHID: Right. Your Honor, I mean, I think when we're -- under Mr. Pierce's theory, respectfully, a CEO would be a custodian in every anti-trust case and perhaps almost any case because they are going to have some amount of unique ESI.

And just to address briefly, because I didn't touch on it before, this point about burden. You know, we have conducted a preliminary review. We know that -- we know that the document custodians have, at least with respect to the e-mails, hundreds of thousands of documents not including attachments. But more to that, Your Honor, I think since these disputed custodians are the ones overseeing broader businesses, broader business issues, including as to unrelated products and unrelated markets, they are going to likely possess a high volume of irrelevant and commercially-sensitive materials that would require a

more time consuming and more burdensome review than with respect to the Pork Management Team.

And I'd also point out, Your Honor, with respect to that under the ESI Protocol order, sort of as it came up in the portion of the argument on calendars, in Section II(K), we're allowed to redact otherwise responsive documents or, quote, highly-confidential business information relating to non-pork businesses.

Now, these individuals are going to have a lot of highly-confidential business information relating to non-pork businesses. And so whatever that small amount of, you know, unique ESI they may have, there's going to be a ton of materials hit by plaintiffs' search terms that are going to require a very burdensome review.

And, you know, there was a reference to plaintiffs' proposed search terms in the last argument, and just to -- and we're working with the plaintiffs on that.

We're hoping to reach an agreement with them. But the latest proposal that we have from them has 325 search terms which reflect literally thousands of combinations. And they are broad. They have words like "beef" and "chicken" in them. They have search terms for things like "price expectation" or "pricing power," without any connection to pork. Another search string is "competition within 25 of trend, challenge or outlook." Another search term is

1 "highest within five of years, decade, cost or costs." 2 And so -- and we're still working through that, 3 Your Honor, but suffice to say we're going to end up 4 hopefully by agreement with a world -- in a world where 5 there's still going to be a hopefully narrowed but still 6 broad universe of search terms. And when you're applying 7 them to people who are not involved in the decision making 8 that is at the heart of this litigation and who have 9 oversight over completely unrelated businesses, it is going 10 to make the review extremely burdensome. 11 Thank you, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 13 Let's turn to the custodian issue with regard to 14 Tyson. And Mr. Pierce, you're up again. 15 MR. PIERCE: Your Honor, I don't mean to stay on 16 I just wanted to point out that we think it's JBS. premature and unproductive to start discussing search term 17 18 negotiations that are in progress and their relevance to 19 this custodian dispute, so I'm not going to get into that. 20 What I would say is at the very least we think 21 that once we do finalize search terms, it would be very 22 helpful for understanding JBS's burden to see how those 23 search terms work when they are applied to these disputed 24 custodians, how many unique hits they generate, and that

would help us better understand both sides' positions.

25

1 But I will now turn to Tyson unless you want to --2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rashid, was there 3 something you absolutely, positively needed to say in 4 response to that? 5 MR. RASHID: Just, Your Honor, that that is not 6 the approach under the cases that have been cited by both 7 sides. Plaintiffs have to come forward with a sufficient 8 factual showing. They have to get out of the gate; and 9 respectfully, we don't believe plaintiffs have done so here. 10 THE COURT: I understand. 11 All right. Mr. Pierce, that doesn't necessarily 12 mean I agree, Mr. Pierce. I'm just saying I understand the 13 point being made. 14 MR. PIERCE: I won't test Your Honor's patience 15 any further. 16 THE COURT: I understand the pertinence of the 17 reference to the discussion about search terms, but let's 18 talk about Tyson. 19 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. PIERCE: 20 I think the dispute with Tyson should hopefully be 21 simpler to address or at least to state our positions. Don 22 and John Tyson were both involved in the company's 23 operations. Mr. John Tyson was chairman of the board 24 throughout I think the entire relevant period. 25 for a short period of time was prominently involved in the

company's operations based on contemporaneous accounts at the start of the relevant period. We think -- we understand that not all chairmen of the board should be custodians by any means, but here we're talking about two individuals who, because of their family status, control the company by having a super majority of the voting shares. So we think their status is a little different than just an ordinary chairman of the board or board member.

And we would also note for Don Tyson that he is -his ESI would run a relatively short period of time from I
think approximately 2009 to 2011, so we think that would
further minimize the burden of, again, assigning him as a
custodian. So that would be our basis for these
individuals.

THE COURT: All right. Other than -- well, I'll probably circle back with that question, but I think I -- I don't need you at this point. Let me hear from Ms. Rohrbaugh in response.

MS. ROHRBAUGH: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

So this is similar to what we have been hearing, just merely that these two individuals are board members. Even a chairman of the board does not seem to tie them to any sort of decision making that is relevant in this case. The fact that their name is Tyson, whether they were the grandson or the son of someone who founded the company in

the 1930s or 40s does not indicate that they would have information that is relevant to this case.

Just to sort of clarify a little bit on these two individuals, they were just board members, not executives during the time period. Don Tyson has not been the CEO since 1991. That's nearly 20 years prior to the start of the relevant time period and it's 10 years prior to Tyson's acquisition of its pork business. So the pork business wasn't even acquired until 2001; and yes, he passed away in 2011, which would be early in this timeframe of the relevant time period alleged by the plaintiffs.

John Tyson, his son, hasn't been CEO since 2006, and it was over two years prior to the start of the relevant time period.

So there's not been anything to substantiate, and that is the burden, we agreed with Mr. Rashid of the standard and the burden that needs to be met here. We do not feel it's been met. We have worked with the plaintiff to explain the status of these individuals.

And I do sort of want to correct that we did not volunteer the CEOs. We started with a list of, probably similar to what we're hearing from Mr. Rashid, of individuals making pork decisions. The pork headquarters is actually in South Dakota. The individuals that are the CEOs and the CFOs sit in Arkansas where the chicken headquarters

is. So this is states away from one another, and their allegations of, you know, references to John or Don Tyson having offices near the CEO in Arkansas to us has little to do with whether they could have walked down the hall and talked to anyone related to the pork business which is situated in South Dakota.

So we worked with the plaintiffs. We offered 29 custodians. We walked through, did our diligence of who here has relevant information covering pricing, procurement, sales, operation, production, finance; then into investor relations and Agri Stats as requested by the plaintiffs, in describing to them the structure and that they have relevant people.

It was actually in a mode of comprise that they requested our CEOs and our CFOs, we agreed to give the CEOs and CFOs. We do not know that they are the prime people to be targeted for this information, but we conceded that we would give them, but that's not a concession that they were the relevant individuals. So I do just want to make sure that is corrected.

There is the predominant focus on chicken for these individuals, the CEOs and CFOs. But these board members, Don Tyson and John Tyson that the plaintiffs are now requesting, are even a step beyond any of these executives and, you know, during this time period. We then

offered a further compromise, a wait-and-see approach. If you see information within the custodians, you know, we could entertain that at a later time.

We don't think that there's any basis, we don't think there will be any basis, to have to bring these individuals in as custodians, and we don't think that the plaintiffs have met their burden.

THE COURT: I guess I would maybe describe the wait-and-see approach as a compromise. That's always — that's always a possibility that when discovery — that's how it works is that when discovery is produced, everybody looks at it and if there's reason to believe in what was produced that there are gaps, there are unique information, there's proportionate information out there elsewhere, I'm not sure it's a compromise to say, Well, we'll talk about that. You would be required to at least talk about that.

MS. ROHRBAUGH: Yes, Your Honor. I guess we were just opening it up that we would be happy to discuss that at any time. They wouldn't need to do anything formal to engage in those kind of discussions. Because what is required is that they meet the burden of showing that these individuals have some basis here for decision making relevant to this case. And, you know, as I will note, some courts consistently hold that simply pointing to someone's hiring and title is not enough. And that seems to be really

1 all that they have done with regard to these board members 2 that are not even executives. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Pierce, you have the last word here. 4 5 MR. PIERCE: We did not mean to imply that Tyson 6 had initially offered its CEOs as custodians and we do 7 appreciate, you know, that we were able to reach an 8 agreement with them regarding the inclusion of CEOs as part 9 of a compromise for the large majority of Tyson's 10 custodians. We do want to assure the Court that we are not 11 pursuing a blind vendetta against all Tyson family members. 12 For instance, Barbara Tyson is a director for Tyson Foods. 13 We have not at any point asked for her as a custodian. Our 14 request for John and Don Tyson is based on our understanding 15 of their role of the company. 16 But I think at this point both sides have stated 17 their positions pretty clearly so I don't have anything else 18 to add. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- I'm going to go off 20 camera for just a few minutes. I want to go back and review 21 some things on this one. I'd like to give you a decision 22 from the bench on this one as well, but I need just a few 23 minutes to consolidate my thinking. 24 So feel free to block video and mute your 25 microphones. Just keep an eye out for when I reappear.

(Pause in proceedings from 10:54 to 11:02 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. So I'm seeing Mr. Pierce, Mr. Rashid, Ms. Rohrbaugh, and our court reporter, and I've got all sorts of other boxes but I think the pertinent folks are back on screen.

So having gone back and not only considered counsels' arguments, of course, but also looked again at the declarations, I am going to deny plaintiffs' motion with respect to both Tyson and JBS custodians at this time, and without prejudice to the opportunity to bring the issue back if a more specific showing can be made as discovery continues.

In determining whether to compel inclusion of a senior -- of a senior executive as an ESI custodian, I do look to the Sedona Principles and the fact that the courts consider both that senior executive's level of involvement in the pertinent decisions and discussions, as well as whether the ESI is likely to be unique and not available from other designated custodians.

In addition, both the Sedona Conference and the -among others, the judge in the *EpiPen* decision that was
cited by defendants, do note, and I agree, that the party in
the best position to make custodial decisions is the party
who is responding to the discovery requests. And the Court,
I think, generally should be loathe to mandate additional

custodians without a more specific reason to believe either that the production that has been made is deficient or that it was just manifestly unreasonable to leave the person out in the first place.

And that showing just hasn't been made, given what I've got here at this point in discovery. It could be made at some point; and if so, obviously the first thing that needs to happen is to meet and confer and hopefully that will resolve it. If not, then you come back to me and there may need to be some additional work done by defendants. But I -- what I have on the record at this point doesn't persuade me that that showing has been made and that these additional custodians ought to be mandated. So I'm denying the motion at this point for those reasons.

I think that covers the motion -- motions that were -- I guess one motion, several points, that were in front of me today. But there is one other thing I want to get on your radar, ask you all to meet and confer about, and get back to me on it. And that is whether it would make sense to consolidate for administrative purposes under a single caption the Winn-Dixie and Puerto Rico cases.

And I will note again here, as I did at the beginning of the hearing, that Winn-Dixie and Puerto Rico plaintiffs' counsel are -- unless they have dropped off, are attending the hearing. It is administratively a hassle,

I'll just put it that way, to manage the three different dockets. Now, I recognize that there is a difference in plaintiffs' counsel among those cases. I know that the cases have -- there's been no motion to consolidate those cases on more substantive grounds.

On the other hand, we are going to have a scheduling order that sets a schedule for both the In Re: Pork case and -- the currently consolidated case and those other two cases that will set the same schedule across the board. And it just strikes me that administratively it would be simpler for all concerned to have one docket, although any particular motion could certainly designate if it is In Re: Pork specific or Winn-Dixie or Puerto Rico specific. We can address that.

But all I would like you to do today, I'm not looking for an immediate response, all I'd like you to do is meet and confer with each other and get back to me by filing a letter -- I suppose at this point it would have to be a letter filed on all three dockets -- that gives me your input about that. If you have diverging opinions, you could describe those diverging positions. But let me know what you think of that and, if it's going to be done, what parameters you would propose setting.

I see Ms. Wagner, at least, waving a hand. Yes, Ms. Wagner.

1 Yes, if I could, the parties have MS. WAGNER: 2 been discussing consolidation and we do have a draft 3 stipulation in progress. 4 THE COURT: Bless you. That's good news to start 5 2021 with. So when do you think you would be able to kind 6 of wrap up that conversation and get something in front of 7 me? 8 I mean, I don't want to speak on MS. WAGNER: 9 behalf of everybody, but my feeling is end of next week. 10 THE COURT: That would be fine. That would be 11 fine. I tell you what. I will look for something by the 12 end of next week. If you get toward Thursday of next week 13 and it looks like you need a little while longer to get it 14 wrestled into submission, just send an e-mail to chambers 15 and let me know it looks like it's going to be the following 16 Wednesday or whatever. 17 So if not Friday, if not next Friday, then give me 18 some update about when I could look for it instead. But I 19 will then back off and let you do what it sounds like you 20 were already working on doing, so thank you for that. 21 Anything else that we need to take up at this 22 time? 23 Going once, going twice. All right. Thank you 24 And we are adjourned. 25 MR. PIERCE: Thank you, Your Honor.

```
1
                 MR. RASHID:
                               Thank you, Your Honor.
2
                 MS. WAGNER:
                               Thank you, Your Honor.
 3
                 (Court adjourned at 11:09 a.m.)
 4
5
 6
7
                I, Carla R. Bebault, certify that the foregoing is
 8
       a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the
 9
       above-entitled matter.
10
11
12
                      Certified by: s/Carla R. Bebault
                                     Carla Bebault, RMR, CRR, FCRR
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```